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Fast-Track Arbitration in Europe (With
Special Reference to the WIPO
Expedited Arbitration Rules)
By JAN PAULSSON*
From the perspective of the arbitration practitioner, one may well
wonder about the seriousness of those who are responsible for draft-
ing international contracts. Nevertheless, international contract draft-
ers tend to complain loud and clear about the defects of the
international arbitral process. Arbitration, they say, has become too
cumbersome, too expensive, and too legalistic-in sum, too contami-
nated by the habits of court litigation. Put on the defensive and con-
sumed by guilt, arbitration specialists have quickly addressed such
charges and have devised solutions to the alleged problems. The arbi-
tration practitioners, however, have typically ignored the suggested
solutions.
For example, in 1988 the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) responded to the call for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) methodologies as a way toward a less costly and disruptive
method for resolving contractual disputes by reforming its Concilia-
tion Rules. The response to this reform, however, has been un-
derwhelming. Despite the simplicity, flexibility, and low cost of the
process, and, more importantly, despite its significant success rate,
parties have not taken advantage of this new solution. In fact, since
the new ICC Conciliation Rules came into force, the number of Re-
quests for Conciliation has been less than three percent of that of Re-
quests for Arbitration.'
As a further example, in the 1970s the international arbitral pro-
cess was perceived as having failed to provide more creative solutions
to problems associated with long-term contracts than were available in
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ordinary courts. The life of a long-term contract depends on its ability
to fill in gaps or make adjustments in light of changing circumstances.
Without this ability, the contract may not last long enough to amortize
the investments necessary, for example, to develop a natural gas field
and its transport system. However, simply bringing such questions to
arbitration may not guarantee resolution under traditional norms.
(For example, the common law has a well-known aversion to enforc-
ing "agreements to agree," and the civil law is similarlty reluctant to
enforce a bargain if the price cannot be determined by reference to
objectively defined criteria.) Thus, in 1978 the ICC instituted the
Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual Relations. Its
purpose is to provide prompt decision-making either in the form of
recommendations, which the parties undertake to consider in good
faith, or to issue decisions which, while not enforceable as awards, the
parties agree to respect as if they were provisions of their contracts.2
This initiative, however, has not been favorably received. In fact,
no one has ever called upon the Standing Committee to act. Indeed, a
report by Mr. Yves Derains, approved by the ICC's Commission on
International Arbitration and published in The ICC International
Court of Arbitration Bulletin, recommends that the ICC abandon this
initiative.3
The 1990 Rules regarding Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure offer a
third and final example of the practice of the ICC.4 This example is
particularly relevant since the principal objective of the Referee initia-
tive was to remedy the problems caused by the slownes3s of the arbi-
tration process. Provisional remedies, to have any practical effect,
need to be-granted in a shorter period of time than is required to form
an arbitral tribunal. The ICC Referee Rules are ambitious in scope,
creating the authority to grant full injunctive relief. Although an ICC
referee's decision is not an award, it is nevertheless binding on the
parties; failure to comply may lead to sanctions by downstream arbi-
trators. The principle behind this initiative was a valid one. In its ab-
sence the only practical source of provisional measures are national
courts, and in the international context, these courts may not always
be neutral, experienced, or indeed authorized by their own laws to
grant adequate relief.
2. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER O COMMERCE AR.
BITRATION § 38.04 (2d ed. 1990).
3. Yves Derains, Report on the ICC Rules on the Regulation of Contractual Relations,
ICC IN'L C. OF ARB. BoLL., Nov. 1994, at 31.
4. See Craig, supra note 2, § 38.03.
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It should be clear from the illustrations above that, no matter
how clever an invention might be, one should not be too eager to
revolutionize the international process. Parties who have actually par-
ticipated in an arbitration tend to be very articulate about its short-
comings. Contract drafters, however, have been unable to learn from
those experiences, or even to consider the possibility of new solutions.
In other words, WIPO Expedited Arbitration may well turn out
to be heralded by critics only to "fail at the box office," which would
force us to question whether people really know what is good for
them.
Putting aside these thoughts and considering the Expedited Arbi-
tration mechanism on its merits, one can see that WIPO is offering the
international community a choice between two systems of arbitration.
The standard approach gives priority to what might be called
legal security. Although it may be that in ninety percent of arbitra-
tions a single experienced arbitrator studying an abbreviated file for
fifty hours will reach essentially the same conclusion as a three-mem-
ber tribunal after 1,000 hours of work, the risk of failure in the re-
maining ten percent is for most parties sufficient, especially in view of
the large stakes involved in international cases, to justify the greater
costs in terms of time and money incurred by a three-member
tribunal.5
The alternative approach, Expedited Arbitration, is designed for
parties who consider time to be of the essence, and who are willing to
accept the marginal reduction in legal security for greater speed and
lower costs.
Some parties may consistently opt for Expedited Arbitration
whenever they can persuade the opposing party to accept it. One can
thus imagine a situation in which companies with a steady, high vol-
ume of transactions, none of which is a dominant part of their busi-
ness, would take a somewhat actuarial view of disputes. In such a
situation, the companies would expect that a certain percentage of
their contracts would give rise to disputes, and (while they would try
5. At least since about 1387, when Chaucer's Canterbury Tales are thought to have
been first published, the English have been dubious about quick fixes:
"Ther nys no werkman, whatsoever he be,
That may bothe werke wel and hastily,
This wol be doon at leyser parfitly."
GEoFFREY CHAUCER, The Merchant's Tale, in THE CANmrnnuRY TALEs 386, 401 (W.W.
Skeat ed. 1973). Some would say that in their quest for perfect justice the English have
sometimes gone to the opposite extreme, and that too much "leyser" can be a bad thing.
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to win them all) they would occasionally accept losing a case. Accord-
ingly, they would be unwilling to spend twice as much money or twice
as much time to improve their success rate by a mere ten percent.
6
Others may prefer Expedited Arbitration because of a cynical be-
lief that a three-member tribunal offers no more legal security than a
sole arbitrator, on the assumption that an error by the presiding arbi-
trator will only be reinforced by a party-appointed arbitrator. While
my own experience is contrary to this cynical view, there can be no
accounting for the variety of human motivations, and little surprise
when people do the right thing for the wrong reason.
More sophisticated parties consider both alternatives and opt for
one or the other according to the circumstances. However, in view of
the scarce attention given to past ICC initiatives by contract drafters,
one might in fact doubt the wisdom of allowing d la carte use of these
mechanisms.
There would be little use here in reviewing the Expedited Arbi-
tration Rules, since the terms are fairly clear.
The drafting committee decided to provide a list of how these
rules diverge from the ordinary Arbitration Rules. One might argue
that it would have been preferable to reproduce the complete text
including the alterations. Had we done that, however, some would
have certainly argued that it would have been better to show only the
alterations. In practice, this should not cause any problems.
7
The essence of WIPO Expedited Arbitration may be summarized
in two phrases: (1) constant appointment of a sole arbitrator; and (2)
tightening of deadlines from beginning to end. Specific provisions of
the Expedited Rules serve to further refine these two fundamental
features. The end result of this process is an award which is as final,
binding, and enforceable as any other. It is simply produced faster.8
6. The savings reasonably to be anticipated in Expedited Arbitration relate to: (i)
the time value of money, which is an obvious motive for wanting quick decisions; (ii) the
fact that legal fees ought to be far less where the well-known maxim "work expands to fill
available time" is reversed; and (iii) the systematic elimination of co-arbitrators. On the
other hand, the fees payable to the sole arbitrator in Expedited Arbitration will be no less
than those payable in ordinary arbitration. Indeed, it may be that accelerated proceedings
may be so disruptive that they justify fixing the sole arbitrator's fee at a higher level within
the ad valorem range.
7. The WIPO Arbitration Center makes available upon request the consolidated text
of the Expedited Arbitration Rules, with modifications appearing in bold-face type.
8. Two special provisions are worthy of mention in this context. Article 53(b) of the
Expedited Arbitration Rules provides that hearings must be convened within 30 days of
receipt of the Statement of Defence, and that only in "exceptional cxcumstances" may
they last more than three days. Expedited Arbitration Rules, WIPO art. 53(b) (copy on file
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Thus, the remaining questions for drafters of dispute resolution
clauses are whether they believe arbitrations can be conducted more
quickly without becoming hasty, and whether less expensive inevitably
means "cheap."
Fast-track arbitration received renewed attention in Europe as a
result of a large number of cases decided by a tribunal constituted
under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in late
1991. In one of these disputes, the price of a commodity was to be
redetermined under a contract requiring the new price to be estab-
lished within 60 days of the Request for Arbitration, half of this pe-
riod constituting the standard thirty day limit available for submission
of the response under the ICC Rules. Under the chairmanship of Pro-
fessor Hans Smit, the arbitral tribunal received the fie on December
20, 1991, ordered all additional written materials to be submitted by
December 30, 1991, held a one day hearing on the merits on January
2, 1992, and rendered an award only 36 hours later (even though the
ICC Court did not issue its decision until January 7, 1992). This case
generated much discussion. The ICC itself published information
about this new approach.'
At the same time, it was realized that this case involved an unu-
sual set of circumstances: cooperating parties from similar business
cultures (the United States and Canada); able and cooperating coun-
sel; a contractually stipulated time limit justifying powerful procedural
initiatives by the arbitral tribunal; and last, but not least, a panel of
compatible, competent, and energetic arbitrators.
Could this example serve as a model for parties to replicate such
speed-inducing factors? That is precisely what WIPO has set out to
do. It remains to be seen whether there will be any takers and, if so,
how satisfactory the process will turn out to be.
with author). Article 55(a) requires that experts named by the arbitrator must complete
their mission within 30 days. Id. art. 55(a) (copy on file with author).
9. See generally ICC INT'L Cr. oF ARB. BuLi., Nov. 1992.
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